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A LAWYER IN CRISIS TIMES: JOSEPH L.
RAUH, JR., THE LOYALTY-SECURITY
PROGRAM, AND THE DEFENSE OF CIVIL
LIBERTIES IN THE EARLY COLD WAR
MICHAEL E. PARRISH*

This Article tells the story of Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., a lawyer who
fought for American civil liberties during a time when they were in
great peril. Rauh challenged the federal government's loyaltysecurity program during the height of McCarthyism and the Red
Scare through his representation of government employees and
contractors that were faced with termination and humiliation due
to allegationsof disloyalty. This Article recounts Rauh's efforts by
examining his representation of James Kutcher, William
Remington, and Charles Allen Taylor, three men who were
accused of disloyalty to the United States under the federal
government's loyalty-security program. Rauh fought for their
right to confront their accusers during hearings conducted to
examine their loyalty and, through Taylor's case, helped put due
process limits on the federal government's loyalty-security
program.
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INTRODUCTION

In the winter of 1799, as revolution raged in France and the
Administration of John Adams prosecuted Americans under the
Sedition Act,' James Madison observed that the government had
invoked a foreign menace to divert public attention from the real
danger to liberty. "The fetters imposed on liberty at home," wrote
this founding father, "have ever been forged out of the weapons
provided for defense against real, pretended or imaginary dangers
from abroad."

2

How grounded in history and how prescient Madison's remarks
proved to be. From the days of the French Revolution and the
Sedition Act in the eighteenth century to the War Against Terrorism
and the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001,' what Madison called "real,
pretended or imaginary dangers from abroad" have presented serious
threats to the liberties of the American people.
In every generation, but especially in times of war, American
lawyers have been called upon to guard the ramparts of civil liberties
when the federal government has invoked a foreign threat to justify
repressive legislation. William Wirt, a future Attorney General of the
United States, defended James Callender of Virginia, who was
charged with violating the Sedition Act in 1798.1 Alexander Dallas, a
future Secretary of the Treasury, represented John Fries, who was
charged with treason against the United States for his resistance to a
federal excise tax.5 In the twentieth century, Harvard law professor
Felix Frankfurter took up the cause of alien radicals, many of whom
were jailed without charges and threatened with deportation during
the Palmer Raids following World War 1.6 Hayden Covington argued
over thirty cases before the Supreme Court on behalf of Jehovah's
Witnesses who faced persecution during the patriotic frenzy of World
War II. Currently, American lawyers such as Donna R. Newman,8

1. An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States, ch. 74, 1
Stat. 596 (expired 1801).
2. James Madison, PoliticalReflections, in 17 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 237,
242 (David B. Mattern et al. eds., 1991).
3. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 ("USA PATRIOT Act"), Pub. L. No. 10756, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
4. United States v. Callender, 25 F. Cas. 239, 241 (D.Va. 1800) (No. 14,709).
5. Case of Fries, 9 F. Cas. 826,841 (D.Pa. 1799) (No. 5126).
6. Colyer v. Skeffington, 265 F. 17, 21-22 (D. Mass. 1920).
7. See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 629-30 (1943)
(requesting that Jehovah's Witnesses be exempted from a school board regulation
requiring the saluting of the American flag); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 106-
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Jenny S. Martinez, 9 Stephen Yagman, l0 and John J. Gibbons, a former
appellate judge," are representing American citizens and foreign
nationals who have challenged the authority of the Bush
Administration to hold them in this country and in Cuba as enemy
combatants without trial or access to legal counsel. These lawyers
today are defending civil liberties in the long tradition forged by Wirt,
Dallas, Frankfurter, Covington, and one of Frankfurter's own
students, Joseph L. Rauh, Jr.
This Article analyzes Rauh's challenge to the federal
government's Cold War loyalty-security program when he
represented federal government employees and contractors faced
with termination and humiliation because "reasonable grounds"
existed to doubt their fidelity to the United States. 2 That program,
launched by President Harry Truman and expanded during the
Dwight
Eisenhower
Administration,
raised
fundamental
constitutional issues, none more vital than the right of persons to
confront those who accused them of disloyalty.
In his representation of James Kutcher, William Remington,
Charles Allen Taylor, and many others, Rauh waged a determined
battle in the federal courts to win for his clients the right to confront
their accusers before federal loyalty review boards. This Article
examines Rauh's litigation strategy in these major cases that helped
pave the way for Supreme Court decisions in the late 1950s. These
decisions ultimately limited the government's authority to shield
informants from cross-examination during loyalty hearings. 3 In Part
I of this Article, I sketch Joe Rauh's career as a lawyer who practiced
08 (1943) (arguing an ordinance requiring payment of a house-to-house solicitation tax
violated the First Amendment rights of Jehovah's Witnesses); Minersville Sch. Dist. v.
Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 591-92 (1940) (defending Jehovah's Witness children expelled for
refusing to participate in the Pledge of Allegiance).
8. See Benjamin Weiser, Judge Affirms TerrorSuspect Must Meet with Lawyers, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 12, 2003, at A17.
9. See William Glaberson, Judges Question Detention of American, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 18, 2003, at A19.
10. See Neil A. Lewis & William Glaberson, U.S. Courts Reject Detention Policy in 2
TerrorCases, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2003, at Al.
11. See Chris Hedges, Ex-Judge Vs. the Government's Law-Free Zone, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 6, 2004, at B2.
12. See Exec. Order No. 9835, 3 C.F.R. 627,630 (1943-1948).
13. See generally Taylor v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 709 (1959) (holding moot a dispute over
an industrial worker's security clearance because the Secretary of Defense reinstated the
employee's clearance after the Court granted certiorari); Green v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474
(1954) (holding that the secretaries of the Armed Forces were not authorized to deprive
an engineer of his job without the procedural safeguards of confrontation and crossexamination).
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civil liberties, civil rights, and labor law in Washington, D.C., from the
days of the New Deal until his death in 1992. Part II introduces three
of his most important clients during the controversy over the federal
government's loyalty-security program of the Truman-Eisenhower
years. Part III focuses on how the accelerating foreign crises of the
early Cold War promoted domestic fear of communism and
espionage and led to Truman's executive order requiring loyalty
investigations of federal employees. Parts IV, V, and VI examine a
number of Rauh's loyalty cases, with special attention to those of
James Kutcher and William Remington. Part VII analyzes how one
case, that of Charles Allen Taylor, helped to put some due process
limits upon the loyalty program by the end of the 1950s.
I. JOE RAUH AND CIVIL LIBERTIES

Joe Rauh's vigorous defense of civil liberties did not begin or end
with the loyalty-security issues of the early Cold War. Rauh, who
died in 1992, joined Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal as a young lawyer
in 1935 after graduating from Harvard Law School. During the
Roosevelt Administration he worked with Ben Cohen and Tommy
Corcoran on public utility regulation in the Wage and Hours Division
of the Labor Department and in the Lend Lease Administration
before becoming a civil affairs officer for General Douglas
MacArthur during World War 11.14 After the war, Rauh opened an
office in Washington, D.C., where he practiced labor, civil rights, and
civil liberties law for the next half a century. Where Americans
suffered economic inequality, government repression, or racism,
Rauh and his firm stood ready to fight for them. He imbibed his
commitment to civil liberties at Harvard Law School in the 1930s as a
student of Professor Frankfurter. Frankfurter was a law school
professor who defended, among others, labor radical Tom Mooney 5
and condemned Italian anarchists Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo
Vanzetti. 16 Rauh's clients included Walter Reuther and the United
Automobile Workers Union, A. Philip Randolph and the
Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, the Mississippi Freedom
Democratic Party, and Joseph A. Yablonski, a reform candidate
inside the United Mine Workers.17
14. See Wolfgang Saxon, Joseph Rauh Jr., Groundbreaking Civil Liberties Lawyer,
Dies at 81, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1992, at L10.
15. See MICHAEL E. PARRISH, FELIX FRANKFURTER AND His TIMES: THE REFORM
YEARS 97-101 (1982).
16. Id. at 176-96.
17. See Saxon, supra note 14.
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In the era of the Cold War he represented numerous persons
called to testify before the House Committee on Un-American
Activities ("HUAC"), notably Lillian Hellman, 8 Arthur Miller, 9 and
James Watkins. Watkins v. United States, ° for example, became a
landmark case on civil liberties when the Warren Court overturned
the defendant's conviction for contempt of Congress and narrowed
the investigative authority of committees such as HUAC.2 1
In these same years, Rauh appeared before federal agencies and
in court on behalf of clients such as James Kutcher, William
Remington, and Charles Allen Taylor to challenge the central
features of the loyalty-security program. Truman's program, covering
all employees of the executive branch, allowed the government to fire
individuals where loyalty boards concluded after a hearing that
"reasonable grounds" existed for doubting the employee's loyalty to
the United States.22 In addition to evidence of a criminal nature,
employees could be terminated for having a "sympathetic
association" with persons or organizations listed by the Attorney
General as totalitarian, fascist, communist, or subversive. "23 One
scholar of the Truman presidency notes that the program "failed to
provide elementary procedural safeguards for those accused of
disloyalty and practically included a presumption of guilt." 24 Kutcher,
Remington, and Taylor, although only three of the many Americans
caught in the dragnet of the loyalty-security program after 1947,
experienced the full range of its absurdity and repression.
II. KUTCHER, REMINGTON, TAYLOR, AND THE COLD WAR IN
AMERICA

James Kutcher lost both of his legs at San Pietro, Italy fighting
for the United States during World War 11.25 After the war, he
earned forty-two dollars a week as a clerk in the Newark office of the
United States Veterans Administration in addition to three hundred
18. See LILLIAN HELLMAN, SCOUNDREL TIME 60-61 (1976).
19. ARTHUR MILLER, TIME BENDS: A LIFE 403-12 (1987); see Miller v. United
States, 259 F.2d 187, 188 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
20. 354 U.S. 178 (1956).
21. Id. at 197 (stating that "abuses of investigative processes may imperceptibly lead
to abridgment of protective freedoms").
22. Exec. Order No. 9835, 3 C.F.R. 627,630 (1943-1948).
23. Id.
24. ALONZO L. HAMBY, BEYOND THE NEW DEAL: HARRY S. TRUMAN AND
AMERICAN LIBERALISM 171 (1973).
25. See Legless Veteran Dismissed as VA Clerk After Branch Board Terms Him
'Disloyal',N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1948, at 32 [hereinafter Legless Veteran Dismissed].
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twenty-nine dollars a month from a disability pension.26 Kutcher also
belonged to the Socialist Workers Party.27 Some United States
government officials, however, did not like his extra-curricular, nongovernmental political activities.28
Bill Remington's past alarmed the federal government, too. A
former employee of the War Production Board, he had socialized
with known communists while working for the Tennessee Valley
Authority and met during the war with Helen Johnson, a woman he
believed to be a journalist. 29 Helen turned out to be a spy for the
Soviet Union.
Charles Taylor, a member of the United Automobile Workers
Union, joined many left-wing organizations in the 1930s, some of
whom had members who were also in the American Communist
Party.3" When Taylor's past became known to the Department of
Defense, he was denied access to classified defense information and
fired from his job at Bell Aircraft.31 James Kutcher, Bill Remington
and Charles Taylor lived worlds apart and never met, but they and
other Americans became part of Rauh's life when the Cold War
between the United States and the Soviet Union heightened national
security concerns and inspired the federal government's loyalty and
security program.
With their vibrant economy, intact political institutions, and a
monopoly on the atomic bomb,32 Americans had every reason to
believe in 1945 that the shattered post-war world could be repaired in
accordance with their values and desires. Indeed, they had reason to
believe that democracy, free trade, and international harmony might
now flourish under the inspiration and leadership of the United
States. Henry Luce, the titan of popular journalism at Time
magazine, proclaimed in 1941 what now seemed possible-"the
American Century."33 Such optimism, however, did not last long into
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See VA Ousts Amputee over His Politics,N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1948, at 18 (noting
that Kutcher was charged with being a member of the Socialist Workers party)
[hereinafter VA Ousts Amputee].
29. See GARY MAY, UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES: THE TRIALS OF WILLIAM
REMINGTON 26-35, 69-70 (1994).
30. Interview with Joseph Rauh, Jr., in Washington, D.C. (Aug. 18, 1985) [hereinafter
August 18th Rauh Interview].
31. Id.
32. See GREGG HERKEN, THE WINNING WEAPON: THE ATOMIC BOMB IN THE
COLD WAR 1945-1950, at 97-136 (1980) (discussing American efforts to retain a
monopoly on the atomic bomb).
33. THE IDEAS OF HENRY LuCE 105 (John K. Jessup ed., 1967).
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the post-war era.
In five short years, events at home and abroad took unexpected
and sobering turns. Neither economic pressure nor the atomic bomb
bent the Soviet Union to America's will in Europe.34 Reneging on
promises made to Roosevelt at the Yalta Conference, Stalin refused
to hold free elections in Poland.35 Behind the Red Army, communist
parties from Poland to Rumania tightened their grip on state power
and displayed less and less toleration for opposition parties. 36 This
was especially true in Czechoslovakia, where the Stalinists overturned
a coalition government and murdered its foreign minister, Jan
Masaryk. 37

Other events soon intensified the anxieties of American leaders.
Lowering an iron curtain across Eastern Europe and matching the
formation of the American-led NATO military alliance against them,
the Soviet Union also entered the atomic age in September 1949.38
Three months later, retreating before Mao Tse-tung's forces that had
earlier proclaimed the creation of the People's Democratic Republic
of China, General Chiang Kai-shek fled with his cache of gold and
300,000 loyal troops to the island of Formosa.39 The red flag of
communism now flew over nearly all of China. A year later, North
Korea launched an attack on the American-supported regime in
South Korea, opening a conflict that would last four years and cost
the United States thousands of casualties.40
Faced with these unexpected events, Americans soon began to
search for scapegoats. Why had American goals and expectations for
the post-war world proved so incapable of speedy realization? Why
had the Soviets gained the upper hand in Eastern Europe and half of
Germany? The Soviet Union, thought to be a backward and
devastated country, had broken America's atomic monopoly.41 The
far left remained politically potent in Italy, France, and Greece.42
Americans were now being asked to pick up the bill for the Marshall
34. STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, RISE TO GLOBALISM:
SINCE 1938, at 64 (5th ed. 1988).

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

35. Id. at 55-56.
36. See Melvin Leffler, The American Conception of National Security and the
Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945-48, 89 AM. HIST. REV. 346, 373 (1984).
37. AMBROSE, supra note 34, at 93-94.
38. HERKEN, supra note 32, at 281-305.
39. ROBERT J. DONOVAN, TUMULTUOUS YEARS: THE PRESIDENCY OF HARRY S.

TRUMAN, 1949-1953, at 74-88 (1982).
40. AMBROSE, supra note 34, at 118.
41. HERKEN, supra note 32, at 97-136.
42. See generally AMBROSE, supra note 34 (discussing the strength of the Communist
Party and the Left in these respective countries).
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Plan, a gigantic relief program in Western Europe. 43 The communists
had triumphed in China, and America's allies had come under attack
in India, the Philippines, and Indochina. Communist North Korea
had attacked South Korea. 44 Was that conflict the beginning of
another world war, barely five years after the last one?
Inside the federal government and outside, those impatient with
complex answers to these questions tended to ignore the devastating
impact of the Second World War.45 They discounted historic Soviet
paranoia about security, the heroic stature assumed by communist
partisans in the struggles against fascism, and the accumulated
grievances of Third World elites against European colonialism.46
Fewer still questioned the reasonableness of America's Vision for the
post-war world.4 7 Unwilling to doubt the nobility of America's goals

or motives, many placed the blame for all these reversals elsewhere.
America, many came to believe, had been the victim of both an
international communist conspiracy and domestic traitors who
furthered the goals of that conspiracy.48
The behavior of the Soviet Union, combined with old and new
evidence of communist influence within the United States soon
turned rational vigilance into irrational panic and generated a fullblown Red Scare that dwarfed in both virulence and duration its
World War I predecessor. The publication of classified government
documents in left-wing magazines 49 and the arrest of Canadian and
British citizens, including physicists Alan Nunn May and Klaus Fuchs,
who confessed to atomic espionage," stoked more fears of a vast
Soviet spy apparatus operating throughout American society. The
arrest of Americans Harry Gold, David Greenglass, and Julius and
Ethel Rosenberg on similar charges of atomic espionage offered
43.

JOHN PATRICK DIGGINS, THE PROUD DECADES:

AMERICA IN WAR AND

1941-1960, at 75-81 (1988).
44. Id. at 86-94; DONOVAN, supra note 39, at 139-47.

PEACE,

45. See JOYCE KOLKO & GABRIEL KOLKO, THE LIMITS OF POWER:
AND UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY, 1945-1954, at 29 (1972).

THE WORLD

46. Id. at 31.
47. MICHAEL H. HUNT, IDEOLOGY AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 151 (1987).
48. See DIGGINS, supra note 43, at 110-17 (describing the red scare); M.J. HEALE,
MCCARTHY'S AMERICANS: RED SCARE POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION, 1935-1965,
passim (1998) (describing suspicions of communist conspiracies); LISLE A. ROSE, THE
COLD WAR COMES TO MAIN STREET:

AMERICA IN 1950, at 20-25 (1999) (discussing

Americans' changing views on communists).
49. See generally HARVEY KLEHR & RONALD RADOSH, THE AMERASIA CASE:
PRELUDE TO MCCARTHYISM (1996) (describing the investigation, arrests, and legal

developments of the alleged communist spies associated with the journal Amerasia).
50. See ALLEN WEINSTEIN & ALEXANDER VASSILIEV, THE HAUNTED WOOD:
SOVIET ESPIONAGE IN AMERICA-THE STALIN ERA 172-222,311-37 (1999).
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further proof of domestic betrayal.5 1
Never one to be out-flanked by his political adversaries, Truman
declined to cede to the Republicans a monopoly on anti-communism.
Unable to intimidate the Soviets abroad, he could harass their past
and present followers at home,52 paint Henry Wallace and his
Progressive Party in the reddest possible hues,53 and secure the
indictment of the Progressive Party's top leaders on the eve of the
presidential election for violating the Smith Act.54 The Smith Act
made it a crime to advocate the overthrow of the government of the
United States by force or violence or to organize any group whose
purpose was to advocate such ideas.5 Truman did not manufacture
56
the new Red Scare alone, but he gave it a significant push forward
and soon lost control of its direction to more ruthless practitionersCongressman Richard Nixon, Roy Cohn, and Senators Pat McCarren,
and Joseph McCarthy.57
III. TRUMAN'S EXECUTIVE ORDER 9835
Initiated by Truman on March 21, 1947 following the publication
of classified State Department documents in the journal Amerasia,
the President's Executive Order 9835 subjected all present and
prospective federal employees in each department and agency of the
executive branch to potential investigation by the FBI to determine
whether evidence existed such that "reasonable grounds exist for
belief that the person.., is disloyal to the Government of the United
States."58
51. See RONALD RADOSH & JOYCE MILTON, THE ROSENBERG FILE: A SEARCH
FOR THE TRUTH 198-223 (1982).
52. HAMBY, supra note 24, at 379-402. See generally ATHAN THEOHARIS, SEEDS OF
REPRESSION:
HARRY S. TRUMAN AND THE ORIGINS OF MCCARTHYISM (1971)

(discussing President Truman's use of anti-communist rhetoric for political gain).
53. "I do not want and I will not accept the political support of Henry Wallace and his
Communists," Truman declared during the 1948 presidential campaign. HAMBY, supra
note 24, at 223. Wallace, he later added, "ought to go to the country he loves so well [the
Soviet Union] and help them against his own country if that's the way he feels." Id.
54. See MICHAEL BELKNAP, COLD WAR POLITICAL JUSTICE: THE SMITH ACT, THE
COMMUNIST PARTY AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 46-53 (1977).

55. 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (2003).
56. THEOHARIS, supra note 52, at 147-71.
57. See ELLEN SCHRECKER, MANY ARE THE CRIMES: MCCARTHYISM IN AMERICA
203-65 (1998); cf. RICHARD GID POWERS, NOT WITHOUT HONOR: THE HISTORY OF
AMERICAN ANTICOMMUNISM 191-272 (1995) (discussing the rise of the Red Scare and
the political leaders behind it).

58. Exec. Order No. 9835, 3 C.F.R. 627, 630 (1943-1948).

The text of Truman's

executive order can also be found at Text of Truman's Order to Shield Employees, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 23, 1947, at 49.
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Truman's edict, covering 2,200,000 jobs, set out six possible
grounds for a finding of disloyalty, including evidence of sabotage,
espionage, treason, or the unauthorized disclosure "to any person" of
"documents or information of a confidential or non-public
character."59 But, in addition to these patent examples of illegal and
criminal conduct, an employee could be found disloyal and fired for
"membership in, affiliation with or sympathetic association with" any
organization, movement, or group of persons "designated by the
Attorney General as totalitarian, fascist, communist, or subversive."60
Attorney General Tom Clark and the Department of Justice drew up
lists of banned organizations largely on the basis of information
provided by the FBI, but without initially affording the groups a
hearing. 61 The original list, for instance, included the National
Council for Soviet-American Friendship, whose 1945 rally at Madison
Square Garden included future Secretary of State Dean Acheson.62
The Truman program afforded employees suspected of disloyalty
a right to have a formal hearing before their agency's loyalty board
and a right to appeal an adverse decision to a loyalty review board.63
The government was not, however, required to disclose the identity of
those who made accusations and employees had no right to examine
the FBI's investigative records.6' In short, an employee had no right
to confront his or her accusers or to cross-examine them.65 Seth

Richardson, a prominent Republican lawyer-politician chosen by
Truman to head the Loyalty Review Board, thought this procedure
unfair, but he finally accepted it when FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover
refused to compromise for fear of exposing FBI informants and
59. Exec. Order No. 9835,3 C.F.R. 627, 630 (1943-1948).
60. Id.
61. See Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 63-73 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (concerning the
dismissal of an employee based on the reports of unidentified FBI informants), affd, 341
U.S. 918 (1951); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 125-28
(1951) (concerning an administrative order labeling specified groups as disloyal to the
United States).
62. DAVID CAUTE, THE GREAT FEAR: THE ANTI-COMMUNIST PURGE UNDER
TRUMAN AND EISENHOWER 45, 581 (1978).
The list was frozen in 1955 with 300
organizations on it, separated in six categories: (a) Communist or Communist front; (b)
Totalitarian; (c) Fascist; (d) Subversive; (e) Advocating the use of force and violence to
deny others their rights; and (f) Aiming to alter the forms of government by
unconstitutional means. Id. at 581. Some organizations were listed under multiple
categories. Id. When General William Saxbe abolished the list in 1974, only thirty of the
300 organizations that were listed in 1955 still functioned. Id.
63. Exec. Order No. 9835,3 C.F.R. 627,630 (1943-1948).
64. See ALAN BARTH, THE LOYALTY OF FREE MEN 109-39 (1951).
65. See id. The Supreme Court, evenly divided, upheld the non-confrontation rule in
Bailey v. Richardson, 341 U.S. 918, 918 (1951) (per curiam).
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activities, including the use of illegal wiretaps. 66
Rauh regarded non-confrontation as a deadly threat to civil
liberties and once had .the opportunity to confront Truman directly on
the issue.67 In 1951, after the program had been operating for four
years, he faced Truman at a White House meeting where the
President asked for the endorsement of Americans for Democratic
Action (ADA), a liberal, anti-communist organization that Rauh
helped to organize in 1948.
When his time came to speak, Rauh
launched into a vigorous attack on the loyalty-security program.69 He
recited case after case where employees had been accused of
70
disloyalty by FBI informants whose identity remained secret.
Truman seemed surprised and shocked by this recital.71 He turned to
his two aides in the room, David Lloyd and Charles Murphy. 72 Lloyd
had once been the victim of political attacks for his past political
associations.73
"Is Joe right, is this kind of stuff going on?" the President
asked.74 Both confirmed Rauh's account.75
"Damn it," Truman said, "we're going to do something about

that. "76
Rauh left the meeting with the impression that the President and
his senior staff would soon address major defects in the program.77
But to his disbelief, a new directive from the chairman of the Loyalty
Review Board three weeks later made it easier for the government to
dismiss federal employees. 78 Instead of a clear finding that the
employee "is disloyal," the new standard required only "that on all
the evidence, there [be] a reasonable doubt as to the loyalty of the

66. See Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., Nonconfrontation in Security Cases: The Greene
Decision, 45 VA. L. REV. 1175, 1175-76 (1959); Seth W. Richardson, Aims and Procedure
Are Outlined by Loyalty Board, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1947, at 29.
67. Interview with Joseph Rauh Jr., in Washington, D.C. (Aug. 15, 1985) [hereinafter
August 15th Rauh Interview].
68. See Saxon, supra note 14.
69. See August 15th Rauh Interview, supra note 67.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. DONOVAN, supra note 39, at 166.
74. Interview by Niel M. Johnson, Truman Presidential Museum and Library, with
Joseph L. Rauh, Jr. 54-55 (June 21, 1989) (transcript available at http://www.
trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/rauh.htm) [hereinafter Johnson Interview].
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. DONOVAN, supra note 39, at 166.
78. See Loyalty Review Board, 16 Fed. Reg. 12214, 12219 (Dec. 4, 1951).
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person involved."7 9 Furious over this change, Rauh called Lloyd, who
confessed ignorance of the new language, but blamed fervent anticommunists on the Loyalty Review Board for the shift.8" Nothing
about the program would change, and Rauh knew it would continue
to produce other victims like those he already knew.
IV. VICTIMS
As the FBI's investigative machinery ground on, ultimately
processing four million files by 1952, thousands of federal employees
found themselves charged with disloyalty and threatened with the loss
of their jobs and reputations. Many of these victims found their way
to Rauh's offices on the second floor of a little green house in
Washington, D.C., on K Street, where their tales confirmed his worst
fears.
Rauh's firm now included another former Supreme Court clerk,
Irv Levy, a brilliant brief writer who had become general counsel to
Walter Reuther's auto workers. Rauh and Levy recruited a softspoken, passionate young civil libertarian from North Carolina,
Daniel Pollitt, a recent graduate of the Cornell Law School. Since
Washington, D.C. did not have a chapter of the American Civil
Liberties Union in the late 1940s, Rauh, Levy, and Pollitt became its
surrogate. "I wasn't supposed to ask them [clients] for any money,"
Pollitt recalled, "if it would embarrass them."8 1 Other Washington
lawyers, however, fattened themselves on the loyalty crusade by
squeezing every nickel out of poor, frightened government workers.
Overburdened with such cases at one point, Pollitt referred a client to
another lawyer after an initial response failed to persuade the agency
to drop the investigation. A few days later, Rauh received a $500
forwarding fee from that lawyer, who intended to charge the client
$1500 for representing him before the loyalty board."
Impoverished clients touched Rauh's sympathy, but they had to
be candid with him about their past, no matter how checkered or
embarrassing. He quickly realized that in the pervasive climate of
fear generated by the loyalty probe and assorted congressional
hearings, shame and fear had become a major obstacle to learning
about a person's former activities and beliefs. He insisted on the

79. See id.
80. Johnson Interview, supra note 75, at 54-55.
81. Interview with Daniel Pollitt, in Washington, D.C (Aug. 13, 1985) [hereinafter
Interview with Daniel Pollitt].
82. Id.
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fullest possible version of the truth and bluntly told clients that he
would walk out of any loyalty hearing if information turned up which
they had concealed.83 The threat worked and he never had occasion
to use it.84
Even before he represented Kutcher, Remington, or Taylor,

Rauh learned from other clients the horrors of the government's
loyalty crusade. During the first six years of the program under
Truman, 12,568 employees endured charges of disloyalty and hearings
that resulted in 519 dismissals, but not a single termination was based
on allegations of treason, espionage, sedition, or the unauthorized
disclosure of confidential information.85 The government ousted
these victims solely on the grounds of their "sympathetic association"
with other persons or organizations and usually on the basis of
information provided by confidential informants.86

Rauh's first client, for example, faced dismissal because he had
been a member of the Washington Book Shop, an organization listed
as a communist front by the Attorney General.87 Like hundreds of
others, he had faithfully patronized that establishment not out of
sympathy for Marx, Lenin or Stalin, but because the bookstore sold
books cheaper than other outlets in the District of Columbia.' He
received a clean bill of patriotic health from the Loyalty Review
Board, but only after Rauh demonstrated that none of the books
purchased had been subversive and produced witnesses who testified
to his client's vigorous anti-communist opinions.89
Loyalty investigators believed they uncovered a palpable threat
to American security when they interrogated another of Rauh's
83. See August 15th Rauh Interview, supranote 67.
84. Rauh did, however, decline to represent those who refused to be entirely candid
about their past political allegiances or who insisted on dictating his legal tactics.
Approached by Mrs. Morton Sobell, whose husband had been charged with conspiracy to
commit espionage as part of the Rosenberg spy ring, he turned her down when she
declined to discuss why her husband had fled to Mexico to avoid arrest and prosecution.
Likewise, Rauh might have played a role in the defense of the eleven Communist Party
leaders charged under the Smith Act, but they insisted that the overall defense strategy
would remain in the hands of other attorneys representing the party. Rauh never declined
to represent clients who had been party members or so close to the party that it made little
difference, notably Lillian Hellman, William Remington, and James Watkins. See Joseph
Rauh, Jr., Oral History, Truman Library, 75; August 15th Rauh Interview, supra note 67;
Interview with Daniel Pollitt, supra note 81.
85. CAUTE, supra note 62, at 268-79.
86. Id.
87. August 15th Rauh Interview, supra note 67.
88. See id.
89. See Interview with Joseph Rauh, Jr., in Washington, D.C. (Aug. 17, 1985)
[hereinafter August 17th Rauh Interview].

1812

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

clients, an employee in the Library of Congress, who had at one time
held an important post in the Russian government. 90 Rauh asked his
client whether he was a member of the Kerensky government. 91
After his client answered in the affirmative, 92 Rauh was forced to
explain to the loyalty board examiners that Kerensky's liberal, anticommunist regime had been overthrown by Lenin, Trotsky, and the
Bolsheviks. 93

Another client faced accusations of disloyalty for purchasing a
car from an employee of the Czechoslovakian embassy;94 another for
donating English translations of the Moscow purge trials to the
Library of Congress; 95 a third for providing milk to the children of sitdown strikers of the Workers Alliance; 96 and a fourth for giving five
dollars to the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee years before it
appeared on the Attorney General's list. 97 Ex-landlords accused
former tenants of receiving regular shipments of "communist
literature," which could mean any publication that mentioned Karl
Marx, Lenin, or Stalin.98 One employee who attempted to switch
agencies against the wishes of his supervisor found himself accused of
disloyalty by this same supervisor and hauled before a hearing board.
Finally exonerated, he could not find another department willing to
employ him for fear that his presence would inspire investigations by
Congress.99
The case of one client, a researcher in the Department of
Defense, demonstrated how far the government could stretch the
elastic concept of "sympathetic association."
She had been a
candidate for local public office on the Communist Party ticket in the
mid-1930s. The Truman Administration not only discharged her for
disloyalty based on this far-removed political choice, but it also fired
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. Id. When this line of questioning proved fruitless, the board subjected Rauh's
client to another battery of questions, including whether or not he believed in God. Id.
David Caute provides a sample of other questions posed by various loyalty boards to
Federal employees, including: "How many times did you vote for Henry Wallace?," "Do
you believe in government ownership of public utilities as a general proposition?," and
"What do you think of female chastity?" CAUTE, supranote 62, at 281-82.
94. August 17th Rauh Interview, supra note 89.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., Revised Loyalty Article 6 (undated) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
98. August 17th Rauh Interview, supranote 89.
99. Id.
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her husband who worked in the Internal Revenue Service, and her
daughter, an employee of the Federal Housing Agency. Finally, the
vigilant officials in nearby Montgomery County, Maryland dismissed
the daughter's spouse, who drove an ambulance operated by the
countyY°°
Only by accident did those charged with disloyalty ever learn the
identity of their hidden accusers. Faced with anonymous allegations
that he held "weekly communist meetings" at his apartment, one
government employee asked an elderly janitor in his building to
testify before the loyalty board.
During the course of the
interrogation it became clear that the janitor had been the source of
the FBI's erroneous information concerning communist meetings,
gatherings that had never taken place. "°
V. THE ORDEAL OF JAMES KUTCHER
The case of the legless James Kutcher epitomized the loyalty
program at its most ludicrous. The short, rotund forty-three-year-old
veteran, gravely wounded during the Italian campaign, eked out a
living as a clerk in the Newark office of the Veterans Administration
("VA"). When not at the VA, however, he served as a leading
spokesman for the Socialist Workers Party, one of several Trotskyite
organizations listed as subversive by the Attorney General of the
United States. In his speeches Kutcher sounded like the most rabid
anti-Soviet member of Congress. °2 He regularly denounced Josef
Stalin as a "Fascist dictator" and denied that his organization
advocated the use of force or violence, except in self-defense against
capitalists who would resist the peaceful transition to socialism. 013
Such distinctions eluded officials in the VA who fired him in
September 1948 after a hearing board in Philadelphia found him to be
disloyal. Richardson's Loyalty Review Board sustained that decision
seven months later. "Two years ago, when I learned to use my
artificial limbs the Government gave me a job," Kutcher told
reporters."° "Now it has taken my job away-not because of any
fault in my work, but because of my political views."'1 5 The
government's vendetta against this anti-Stalinist communist had just
begun.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Interview with Dan Pollitt, in Washington, D.C. (Aug. 18, 1985).
Rauh, supra note 66, at 1176-77.
August 17th Rauh Interview, supra note 89.
See VA Ousts Amputee, supra note 28; Legless Veteran Dismissed,supra note 25.

104.

VA Ousts Amputee, supra note 28.

105. See id.; Veteran's Appeal on U.S. Job Denied, N.Y. TIMEs, May 2, 1949, at 7.
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Following the loyalty board decision, the Newark Housing
Authority attempted to evict Kutcher and his father from their lowincome apartment when the elder Kutcher refused to sign an affidavit
that no one in the unit belonged to an organization on the Attorney
General's list. 106 The VA also sought to strip Kutcher of his $329-amonth disability pension by claiming that his affiliation with the
Socialist Workers Party and his various speeches gave "aid and
comfort to the enemy" during the Korean War. 107 For the next seven
years, despite the doubts of several friends who said he should be
defending more appealing clients, Rauh and his firm battled to save
Kutcher's job and pension by attacking the loyalty program in several
rounds of administrative hearings and judicial proceedings. 0 8
Three years after his dismissal had been upheld by federal
district Judge Edward Curran, the Federal Circuit Court for the
District of Columbia ordered a new loyalty hearing for Kutcher.'09
The court ruled that the VA administrator who fired him had not
complied with Truman's executive order because he failed to weigh
the totality of evidence and because he based his decision solely on

the Attorney General's listing of the Socialist Workers Party."0
When a second round of hearings again went against Kutcher and
Judge Curran again upheld his firing, Rauh filed a second appeal with
the circuit court.'
Although split two to one, the appeals court now ruled that

Kutcher had been improperly dismissed under general civil service
regulations because the charges of disloyalty (i.e., membership in the
Socialist Workers Party) bore only the vaguest relationship to the

actual findings of the hearing board.'

2

Kutcher, the majority

106. August 17th Rauh Interview, supra note 89.
107. Kutcher Denies Being Disloyal, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1955, at 4 [hereinafter
Kutcher Denies Being Disloyal].
108. Pollitt described the poorly-educated Kutcher as "a slob" who had been
shamelessly exploited by the Trotskyites for propaganda purposes. Interview with Daniel
Pollitt, supra note 81. Rauh held his nose through the showing of a documentary film
about the Kutcher case produced by the Socialist Workers Party and later when Kutcher
publicly praised the North Koreans and Chinese. Id.
109. Kutcher v. Gray, 199 F.2d 783, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1952) (remanding to district court
for determination by the Administrator of the VA whether there were reasonable grounds
for believing that Kutcher was disloyal to the government).
110. Id. at 787. The court refused, however, to pass on Rauh's constitutional challenge
to the entire program and specifically affirmed the legality of the Attorney General's
listing of organizations even without affording the organizations a hearing. Id. at 788.
Moreover, the court did not overturn Kutcher's original suspension. Id. at 789.
111. August 18th Rauh Interview, supra note 30.
112. Kutcher v. Higley, 235 F.2d 505, 509 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (comparing the charges
against Kutcher and the reasons given for his discharge).
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reasoned, had not received notice nor been given "a fair chance to
defend himself upon the very grounds on which he may be
'
discharged."113
Even in the face of this second ruling by the appeals
court, Judge 11Curran
expressed reluctance to sign an order of
4
reinstatement.
"I don't mind being reversed by the court of appeals," the judge
told Rauh, his voice dripping with ridicule." 5
"Not even twice in one case?" Rauh replied, a retort that risked
contempt." '6
In the summer of 1956, the VA finally announced Kutcher's
reinstatement in the Newark office "with full seniority," but not with
back pay." 7

Overturning the VA's decision to terminate Kutcher's disability
benefits proved somewhat easier, thanks to the ineptness of the
agency's bureaucrats and the assistance of Herbert L. Block
("Herblock"), the celebrated cartoonist at the Washington Post.
Rauh and his new partner, John Silard, insisted on a public hearingi8
before the Committee on Waivers and Forfeitures of the VA.
Kutcher and the Trotskyites notified the press, which turned out in
full force with cameras and microphones." 9 Rauh and Silard made
certain Kutcher hobbled into the hearing room using two canes,
festooned with all his battle ribbons and a Purple Heart. 2 '
The chairman of the committee, Peyton H. Moss, opened the
proceedings by announcing that Kutcher was not on trial for a crime.
But, he added, the VA had been given the authority by Congress to
deny benefits to anyone "shown by evidence satisfactory to the
Administrator of Veterans Affairs to be guilty of mutiny, treason,
sabotage, or rendering assistance to any enemy of the United
States."'' Kutcher had been charged specifically, Moss continued,
with giving aid to the nation's enemies by making statements such as
that he "liked the Red system of government," that the government
of the United States was composed of "cheaters and crooks who
oppress the working people," and that members of his party should
113. See id. at 507.
114. August 17th Rauh Interview, supra note 89.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Legless Veteran Gets Back V.A. Job, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1956, at 16; August
18th Rauh Interview, supra note 30 [hereinafter Legless Veteran Gets Back V.A. Job].
118. Legless Veteran Gets Back V.A. Job, supra note 117.
119. Kutcher Denies Being Disloyal, supra note 107.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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"cause strikes and get in key positions to take over the government of
the United States. '2 Moss said that by "espousing and defending"
the Socialist Workers Party, Kutcher had "rendered aid and
assistance to an enemy of the United States. 123 When the chairman
concluded, Rauh opened the hearing by asking Moss for a copy of the
rules "under which the committee will be proceeding today.' ' 24 That
caught Moss and the committee completely off guard because they
had never conducted a similar hearing.
125
"I'll make the rules as we go along," Moss replied.
At that procedural gaffe, the hearing room erupted in laughter
from the assembled journalists and Moss immediately called for a
recess.'26 The rattled chairman never regained the advantage. When
the hearing finally resumed, the chairman asked Kutcher's lawyer to
present his case. 127 Rauh demanded to know who made the charges
against his client and when they might appear at the hearing. 128 Moss
explained that the accusers would not be at the hearing and that their
identities could not be disclosed in accordance
with a policy adopted
129
States.
United
the
of
by the President
Rauh next asked Moss to dismiss the charges against Kutcher on
the grounds that they amounted to a charge of treason, accusations
that had never been tested in a court of law. 30 Further, he argued,
the VA had no authority to make such a finding.'

The charges also

constituted an infringement of the First Amendment, Rauh added,
because the government sought to censor a pensioner's right to
speak.132 Nothing his client had said during the Korean War, he
concluded, "could have possibly done as much to undermine the war
effort as some of the 1952 campaign statements of General
Eisenhower."' 3 3

In defending Kutcher before the Committee on

Waivers and Forfeitures, Rauh deployed three effective strategies.
By insisting upon an open hearing with reporters present, he
guaranteed wide coverage in the newspapers, with the knowledge that
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. August 18th Rauh Interview, supra note 30.
125. VA Conduct of Kutcher Hearing Hit, WASH. POST & TIMES HERALD, Dec. 31,
1955, at 1.
126. August 18th Rauh Interview, supra note 30.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Kutcher Denies Being Disloyal,supra note 107.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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some of them had been editorially sympathetic to his client in the
past.134 He launched into a procedural attack upon the committee's
jurisdiction and its apparent absence of rules; and finally, he put the
interrogators on the defensive by suggesting their charges against
Kutcher raised fundamental constitutional issues of treason and
freedom far beyond their competence.
Rauh's procedural gamble and Moss's ineptitude doomed the
VA's case against Kutcher. The morning edition of the Post carried
Herblock's devastating cartoon comparing Moss's conduct to the Mad
Hatter's Tea Party in Alice in Wonderland.'35 It bore the caption:
"How the Government Intends to Handle the Kutcher Case: We
Make Up the Rules As We Go Along.' 13 6 On January 8, 1956, Moss's
committee announced that Kutcher would keep his benefits because
the government lacked sufficient evidence "beyond a reasonable
doubt" that he had "knowingly and intentionally" given aid to
America's enemies.' 37 Thanks to Rauh's aggressive defense tactics,

Kutcher kept his job and his disability pension. Bill Remington was
not so lucky.
VI. THE MANY TRIALS OF WILLIAM REMINGTON

William Walter Remington was blessed with brains, good looks,
and a resume that included government service on the War
Production Board, the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion,
and the President's Council of Economic Advisers. He, however,
presented Rauh with a far more challenging set of circumstances once
Remington was named as a major figure in an extensive Soviet
espionage organization by Elizabeth Bentley.
In November 1945, Bentley, soon to be known to the American
press as "the blonde spy queen," entered unnoticed into a field office
of the FBI to confess that she had for many years spied on behalf of
the Soviet Union. 13 Now a defector and fearing for her life, the
134. See, e.g., Editorial, The Kutcher Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1952, at 18; Editorial,
The Kutcher Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1955, at 22.
135. See Herbert L. Block, "God, I Wish I'd Said That," WASH. POST, Jan. 6, 1956, at
24; August 18th Rauh Interview, supra note 30.
136. Block, supra note 135. Block sent Rauh the original of his cartoon, and Rauh
later prominently displayed it in his law office.
137. August 15th Rauh Interview, supra note 67; Kutcher Denies Being Disloyal, supra
note 107; Alvin Shuster, Accused Veteran Will Keep Benefits, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1956, at
1.
138. KATHERINE S. OLMSTEAD, RED SPY QUEEN:

A BIOGRAPHY OF ELIZABETH

BENTLEY 89-111 (2002). Bentley first tested the waters with the FBI in August 1945 at
one of the agency's small field offices in New Haven, Connecticut. Id. at 89. She told the
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graduate of Vassar College told agents she had spied for seven years,
collecting U.S. government information from dozens of highly placed
agents in various federal agencies.'39 She named Remington among
the many people she claimed had been party members or had40
engaged in espionage for the Soviet Union during the war years.1
Remington, she claimed, had done both. According to her account,
Remington gave her information from the War Production Board on
aircraft production and plans to produce synthetic rubber.' He paid

his dues to the party, too, but their contacts ended when Remington
entered the Navy in 1944.142

. In the wake of Bentley's charges, the FBI placed Remington
under intense scrutiny, including the use of wiretaps, for over a
year. 43 The Bureau alerted the White House and others in the
executive branch to the accusations, and finally interrogated
Remington in the spring of 1947, all with the hope of securing a

prosecution for espionage.'" The Bureau and the Department of
Justice abandoned that effort, however, when it became clear their
case would likely rest on the testimony of a single witness-Bentley-

a woman prone to severe bouts of alcoholism and depression. 145 In
addition, they had been unable to unearth proof of any information

provided by Remington that had reached
the Soviet Union with the
46
intent of injuring the United States.
A federal grand jury in New York, after grilling Remington in
the spring of 1948, reached the same conclusion. 4 7 By then, however,
agent in charge that she worked for a shipping firm in New York with economic ties to the
Soviet Union and that she had been approached by someone she believed to be
impersonating a government agent. Id. at 90. A month later she dangled more
information about "espionage" before FBI agents in New York, one of whom thought she
might be psychotic. Id. at 95-96. In November, she returned to that office to make her
first full confession about spying for the Russians. Id. at 99.
139. Id. at 3, 36-52, 57-59.
140. Id. at 53-54.
141. Id. Olmstead called Remington:
[A]n insignificant source for Elizabeth, but he would become her most important
opponent in her later, ex-Communist career .... [Bentley] contemptuously
dismissed him as 'a small boy trying to avoid mowing the lawn or cleaning out the
furnace when he would much rather go fishing.'... Elizabeth wanted to dump
Remington as a source, especially since his information was rather marginal.
Id.
142. GARY MAY, UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES:
THE TRIALS OF WILLIAM
REMINGTON 82-87 (1994).
143. Id. at 77, 87.
144. Id. at 89-91.
145. Id. at 77-78, 84-85, 88, 95.
146. Id. at 89.
147. Id. at 92-94.
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Remington himself had become a willing informant for the FBI. 48
He told agents, "[I am as] eager as you [the Bureau] are to help rid
this country of communists and their sympathizers.' ' 49 Now anxious
to assist Hoover's agents in their anti-subversive campaign, he
insisted that he had never been a member of the Communist Party or
given Bentley anything other than public information from the War
Production Board to which anyone claiming to be a reporter would
have been entitled.150 When Bentley publicized her charges more
widely, however, Remington's troubles deepened considerably.
In July 1948 before a Senate Committee chaired by Homer
Ferguson of Michigan, the "the blonde spy queen" repeated her
charges against Remington: she alleged that from 1941 to 1943 she
had passed his reports and others on to her lover, Soviet spy master
Jacob Golos, who had died of a heart attack in 1943.151 Remington

had no choice but to go public with his own version of events.
Responding to Bentley's public charges, he appeared before
Ferguson's committee and denied to the press ever having been a
member of the Communist Party or giving Bentley "one single scrap
of confidential information."152 He admitted knowing and meeting
with Bentley during the war when she called herself Helen Johnson,
and represented to him that she was a journalist. 15 3 He paid her for
newspapers, he said, not party dues. 54 But he also admitted having
been introduced initially to Bentley/Johnson and Golos by his
mother-in-law, Elizabeth Moos, an active Communist Party member,
and Moos's long-time boyfriend, Joe North, founder and editor of the
communist weekly, New Masses.'55
Remington did admit giving Bentley/Johnson routine reports
from the War Production Board similar to those he provided to other
journalists.'56 He denied that he ever gave-Bentley/Johnson "one
single scrap of confidential information."' 57 He stated emphatically
that he did not know Bentley/Johnson or Golos were spies or even
party members.'58 Remington concluded his rebuttal by pointing to
148. Id. at 93-94.
149. Id. at 93.
150. Id. at 90.
151. OLMSTEAD, supra note 138, at 127-34.

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

MAY, supra note 142, at 95-96, 97-100, 101-04.
Id. at 90.
Id.
Id. at 89-90, 98.
Id. at 90.
Id. at 98.
Id. at 99-100.
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his strong anti-Soviet views, including recent support for the Truman
Doctrine and the Marshall Plan.159 He praised Bentley for coming
forward to expose subversion in the government and Ferguson's
committee for furthering these efforts. 16°
Bentley's Senate appearance triggered a hearing before the
Fourth Region Loyalty Board in Washington to determine
Remington's loyalty and fitness to continue serving in the Commerce
Department. 6 ' In addition to the Ferguson hearings, that board also
had access to an extensive FBI file on Remington based on the
Bureau's investigation into his past associations and activities at the
time of his appointment as director of the Commerce Department's
export program. 62 Remington's FBI file provided grist for both his
enemies and his defenders.
On the one hand, it documented Remington's extraordinary
network of friendships and associations with people and organizations
who were either openly communist or sympathetic to communism,
some reaching back to his college days at Dartmouth. 163 But
classmates and administrators also offered a confusing portrait of
Remington's ideological orientation. They recalled, for example, that
he had denounced as "hysterical and irresponsible" the leaders of the
communist-dominated American Student Union at Hanover, but that
he regularly attended their meetings as well as those of the Young
Communist League where he "defended his views of Communism
with zeal and deep conviction. ' ' 6" Remington's activities after
Dartmouth painted a portrait of a man on the left, but someone who
also wanted to be all things to all people.
Taking a leave from Dartmouth at the start of his junior year in
1936, he worked as a messenger at the Tennessee Valley Authority
("TVA") in Knoxville' 65 There he joined the Workers Education
Committee, a group active in promoting union organization among
the valley's workers. Remington also encouraged TVA employees to
re-affiliate with the CIO, and socialized with a number of men and
159. Id. at 108.
160. See id. at 98 (stating that he had a high regard for Bentley and believed she was
sincere).
161. Id. at 101.
162. See id. at 76-77, 94-95 (stating that the FBI investigated him for thirty days in
1948).
163. See id. at 104, 106-10 (detailing Remington's associations with communist groups
since college).
164. Id. at 39-40.
165. See id. at 25 (explaining that he did so to "work and struggle and get knocked
around a bit").
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women such as Howard Bridgman, Muriel Speare, and Kit Buckles,
166
all of who were active in the local Communist Party organization.
They considered him a member, and a few of them recalled
1 67
Remington's own recruitment efforts on behalf of the party.
In 1938, Remington married Ann Moos, a graduate of
Bennington, whom he first met at a conference of the United Student
Peace Committee."6 Introduced to party leaders by her mother
whose Croton-on-Hudson estate had become a gathering place for
Communist Party activists and assorted radicals, Ann Moos later
claimed that Remington had vowed to remain faithful to the party as
a condition of their marriage.169 While her husband completed his
doctoral studies in economics at Columbia, Ann worked as a
secretary in the New York office of the American Youth Congress.170
They contributed money to the financially ailing New Masses and
spent most weekends at Croton, where they met North and other
party leaders, who in turn introduced them to Bentley when the
Remingtons moved to Washington in 1940.171
Several FBI informants recalled that Remington had defended
the Soviet invasion of Finland in 1939-40 and denounced American
aid to England prior to the German invasion of the Soviet Union, two
positions consistent with the official Communist Party line.172 But in
the wake of Germany's defeat, Remington's foreign policy views took
on a decidedly anti-Soviet cast. 173
He opposed the so-called
Morgenthau Plan that would have stripped Germany of much of its
industrial potential, and supported both the Truman Doctrine and the
Marshall Plan, as well as efforts to restrict American exports to the
Russians. 174 And according to Thomas Blaisdell, his boss in the
Commerce Department, Remington's virulent anti-Soviet views had
provoked criticism from State Department officials.'7 5
Truman's Executive Order instructed hearing boards to
166. Id. at 27-29, 55, 105-12.
167. See id. at 27-35 (describing Remington's activities with the Communist Party in
Tennessee).
168. Id. at 44-52.
169. Id. at 211-13,248.
170. See id. at 57, 64-65 (explaining Bill and Ann's connection to the American Youth
Conference).
171. Id. at 69, 90, 99, 105.
172. See id. at 57-58 (describing the meeting of the American Youth Congress's Citizen
Institute in 1940).
173. Id. at 73.
174. See id. (explaining that Germany would need to be rebuilt to successfully oppose
communism).
175. Id. at 113.

1822

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

determine the present loyalty of federal employees, but Remington's
inquisitors dismissed the testimony of people like Blaisdell and based
their conclusions upon his past activities, especially the relationship to
Bentley during the war that they interpreted as "imparting non-public
'
information to a person closely identified with communists."176
The
board gave Remington an official notification that he had been found
disloyal; termination of his employment at the Commerce
Department followed swiftly, but he was given twenty days to appeal
to the Civil Service Commission Loyalty Review Board. 77
More than thirty years after he agreed to represent Remington in
his appeal, Rauh wrote that "the big story is not what Remington did
(that will always be shrouded in the gray area of uncertainty) but
what a hysterical society did to Remington for, at the worst, stupid
and show-off activities."' 78 Rauh might have added that Remington
had been a victim of his own desire to please virtually everyone who
came into his life-professors, classmates, a wife, a mother-in-law,
communists, even FBI agents. Throughout his adult life, it appears,
Remington had been a psychological chameleon who easily altered
his political coloration depending upon the circumstances.
In 1948 and later, Rauh doubted he would ever know the whole
truth about Remington's life. Had his client joined the party? Paid
dues? Had he given Bentley non-public information? Did he know
she was a communist spy working for the Soviets? Remington
admitted to the FBI at one point that Bentley's allegations "were
basically correct and that he was convinced that she had talked to the
persons named by her. ' 179
But he also insisted she gave
"incorrect... certain details ... concerning himself, that he never had

any overt Communist Party discussion with her and that he did not
give her any confidential information."' 18
Only as the case unfolded did Rauh learn more of the details of
Remington's youthful activities at Dartmouth and in Knoxville,
details which his client had not volunteered and which Rauh himself
had not initially probed, given what he assumed would be the
government's emphasis upon his client's present loyalty to the United
176. Id. at 120.
177. Id. at 119.
178. Letter from Joseph L. Rauh to Gary May, Historian, University of Delaware
(Apr. 10, 1981) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
179. See Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the FBI, to Thomas C.
Clark, Attorney General (Oct. 1, 1948) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review),
Joseph L. Rauh, Jr. File, Records of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington,
D.C. [hereinafter Rauh FBI File].
180. Id.
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States. Remington had not been forthcoming, Rauh later believed,
because, "the hysteria made it impossible for anybody to tell the truth
in those days....
They were all scared green by the public
reaction.., whipped up by the slightest admission of communist
leanings or associates.""18
Rauh decided to become Remington's
lawyer in 1948 because he believed him to be "a decent boy,"
someone entitled "to make18 2a mistake, even a bad mistake, without
being crucified as disloyal.'
Rauh sensed that Remington's appeal would be his most
challenging and controversial loyalty case. He therefore sought the
aid of other attorneys outside his firm, especially ones with
impeccable conservative credentials. 8 3 He approached John Lord
O'Brian, next to Henry Stimson, the dean of progressive
Republicanism, but O'Brian declined to serve even when Rauh
offered to do all the legal drudgery."8 Rauh received a positive
response, however, from Bethuel M. Webster, an esteemed member
of the New York bar who served in the Department of Justice under
Presidents Coolidge and Hoover, but had also written sonnets about
the injustice done to the condemned anarchists Sacco and Vanzetti. 8 5
The procedures of the loyalty boards, especially their reliance
upon secret informants and accusers in undisclosed FBI reports, made
Remington's lawyers' job extremely difficult. It was essentially like
entering a pitch-black room without the aid of a flashlight. Even with
a transcript of the original hearing, Rauh and Webster did not know
for certain how the regional board had assessed each charge against
Remington, but they decided to challenge directly the credibility of
Bentley, his chief accuser. They asked the Loyalty Review Board to
invite Bentley to testify. 86 Encouraged by Rauh and attorney
Richard G. Green, Remington also filed a libel suit against the spy
queen in New York after she repeated her accusations against him on
the NBC radio program, Meet the Press.187 Their strategy almost
succeeded and garnered support from a surprising source inside the
loyalty bureaucracy.
The attempt to draw Bentley into an arena where she might be

181. See August 17th Rauh Interview, supra note 89.
182. See id.
183. August 15th Rauh Interview, supra note 67.
184. Id.
185. See MAY, supra note 142, at 121-22 (explaining that if Rauh convinced Webster
that Remington was innocent, Webster would take the case).
186. Id. at 121.
187. Id. at 118, 136-37.
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subjected to tough cross-examination received encouragement from
Richardson, the chairman of the Loyalty Review Board, who had
initially opposed the use of confidential informants. Richardson's
own youthful attachment to Robert La Follette's brand of Republican
progressivism in Wisconsin had once been used to brand him as a
subversive. Despite Richardson's intensive efforts, however, Bentley,
who had recently converted to Catholicism and taken shelter under
the wing of the Right Reverend Fulton J. Sheen, a militant anticommunist, refused to appear before the board.'

Bentley's unwillingness to testify, combined with a bundle of
affidavits from prominent government figures who all vouched for
Remington's loyalty and staunch anti-Soviet views, proved decisive.
Richardson and his two colleagues on the board, one of whom served
as a former national commander of the American Legion, focused
largely on Remington's record since the war and gave little credence
to old events at Dartmouth or at the Tennessee Valley Authority
during the 1930s. 189 They even discounted Bentley's tale of espionage

by noting that Russia had been America's ally during the war, that
American official efforts had been made to keep her in the struggle

against Hitler, and that "giving the Russians information with respect
to the progress of our war effort wouldn't necessarily spell
disloyalty.'

90

Rauh, Webster, and Remington could sense victory

when the hearings ended, a forecast that proved correct.
In early February 1949, finding no reasonable grounds to believe
188. Id. at 125-26.
189. See id. at 129-30. Led by Richardson, the Loyalty Review Board's decision
rebuked the regional board for ignoring the letter of Truman's executive order, which
required investigators to base their decision on a judgment about an employee's present
loyalty to the United States, not past conduct, associations, or beliefs. Id. at 130.
Richardson's board therefore discounted Remington's years at Dartmouth and the
Tennessee Valley Authority, for example, episodes that would later be used against him
by the House Committee on Un-American Activities and federal prosecutors. See id. at
129. "It would be unfair for our board to bind a man forever by what he did as a youth,"
Richardson observed. Id. Richardson knew from first-hand experience how the past
could stigmatize a person. While studying law at the University of Wisconsin in 1902, he
supported Progressive governor Robert La Follette. See id. Years later, Richardson's
nomination to become Assistant United States Attorney General was held up because
Attorney General William D. Mitchell equated La Follette and Richardson with
communism. See id. Other loyalty hearings, however, frequently departed from the
standard used by Richardson and his colleagues in the Remington case by focusing on an
employee's past. See CAUTE, supra note 62, at 180-83.
190. MAY, supra note 142, at 129. Richardson did not believe Remington had dealt
with Bentley "as part of his official permissive duty." Id. at 130. Their relationship struck
him as "off-color," but, like Rauh, he concluded Remington "was very young and
immature, the times were different, and his work since has been above criticism." Id.
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Remington was disloyal, the Richardson board ordered him
reinstated to his post in the Commerce Department with back pay
amounting to $5,813.72.191 Not long after that decision, Remington's
ordeal and vindication received sympathetic treatment from Daniel
Lang in a long New Yorker essay that also cast further doubt on
Bentley's credibility."9 Six months later, after federal judge Edward
Conger ruled that Remington's libel suit against Bentley, NBC, and
General Foods should proceed to trial, lawyers representing the
network and sponsors of Meet the Press settled the litigation for
$9,000.193 Remington's only setback came when his superiors at the
Department of Commerce demoted him in the hope he might resign,
but he refused to quit, fortified by these victories over Bentley. That
decision, however, became his death warrant.
The blond spy queen had a desperate need to rebuild her
reputation by 1950, when she was dismissed from a teaching position
in Chicago for alleged "moral laxity" and she failed to find a
publisher eager to buy her memoirs of life in the Soviet
underground. 194 Other persons and organizations also had staked
their reputations in the anti-communist crusade upon her version of
Soviet espionage and American betrayal, especially committees of
Congress, the Department of Justice, the FBI, and John Gilland
Brunini, director of the Catholic Poetry Society and Bentley's literary
collaborator. 9 And, by coincidence, Brunini served as the foreman
of the federal grand jury in New York charged with investigating
Soviet espionage in the United States. 196 William Remington,
exonerated by the government's own loyalty machinery, now
threatened the credibility of powerful government agencies, their
supporters and patrons. One of those institutions was HUAC, which
to this point had been marginalized in the Remington affair.
But at the end of April 1950, Congressman John S. Wood,
chairman of HUAC, announced that Remington would be called
before his body to respond to testimony from former residents of
Knoxville who knew him to be a member of the Communist Party in
1936 to 1937.197 Despite the ruling of the Richardson board and the

191. Id. at 132.
192. Daniel Lang, The Days of Suspicion, NEW YORKER, May 21, 1949, at 37.
193. See MAY, supra note 142, at 142-43.
194. See OLMSTEAD, supra note 138, at 153-58.
195. Id.
196. See id. at 156.
197. See MAY, supra note 142, at 147-54 (discussing the three witnesses who testified
about Remington's activities in Knoxville).
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guidelines in Truman's executive order, Wood also urged the Loyalty
Review Board to reopen its inquiry in light of these old allegations
from Remington's youthful past. The Brunini-dominated grand jury
was not far behind HUAC. Two months later, after calling Bentley,
Remington, and Remington's ex-wife Ann to testify, Brunini's grand
jury returned an indictment charging Remington with perjuryspecifically, charging that he had lied about his past membership in
the Communist Party. 98 Rauh now faced legal challenges on several
new fronts.
Remington's chief attorney had little difficulty punching large
holes in the testimony of HUAC's "new witnesses" from Remington's
days at TVA. They admitted their own past activities in the
Knoxville cell of the Communist Party, but could only verify that
Remington had joined them in efforts such as the Workers Education
Committee and in organizing activities for the Textile Workers
Union.19 9 Those were not efforts exclusively led or directed by the
party. Remington, they said, had socialized with them and traded
motorcycles, but they also placed him at gatherings that Remington
reached Knoxville or after his
alleged took place either before he
00
return to Dartmouth in June 1937.2
But defending Remington against the perjury charge proved to
be another matter. The government had unlimited resources for
lawyers and investigators, while Rauh's client and his parents had
finally exhausted their bank accounts after posting $5,000 bail.2 1
Webster, pleading obligations to his law firm, also declined to
continue. A close friend of the Remington family temporarily
rescued the defense until Rauh could raise $20,000 from the James
Marshall Civil Liberties Trust.20 2 He pleaded successfully that
Remington's ability to receive a fair trial had been compromised by
anti-communist hysteria and that his conviction would intensify the
purge of liberals and non-conformists from the federal government.
To replace Webster, Rauh recruited another establishment attorney,
William C. Chanler, a partner in Henry Stimson's old law firm and a
former corporation counsel for New York City during the LaGuardia
198. Id. at 157.
199. See id. at 148-54 (discussing the testimony of the new witnesses).
200. Memorandum from Guy Hottel, FBI Agent, to J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the
FBI (May 5, 1950) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); Letter from Joseph
Rauh, Jr., to Seth W. Richardson, Chairman, Loyalty Review Board (May 6, 1950) (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review).
201. See MAY, supra note 142, at 183.
202. See id. at 184.
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Administration.20 3

On the new perjury charge, Remington now faced a more
formidable accuser than Bentley-his ex-wife, Ann Moos, angry and
vengeful because he blamed her and her mother for all his legal
difficulties. Ann now testified for the prosecution that Remington
had been a member of the Communist Party.2°4 Her incriminating
statements before the grand jury came, however, only after hours of
relentless interrogation by Brunini and federal prosecutor Thomas
Donegan, 20 5 an ordeal that Judge Learned Hand on the Second

Circuit Court of Appeals later described as bordering upon duress
and torture.2°
According to those grand jury transcripts, Donegan declared that
he believed Remington was a communist when he met Bentley and
gave her information from the War Production Board. Initially, Ann
resisted that conclusion and fought back: "Well, I am sure he
wasn't."2 7 She added firmly, "I am convinced that he is not [a

communist] and has not been... but he is a devious sort. 20 8 Later in
her testimony, after being denied food, told that she could not invoke
either the Fifth Amendment or her marital privilege, and threatened

with a perjury indictment, Ann finally altered her story to the grand
jury. Her husband, she said, had given money to the Communist
Party.
203. The FBI commenced an investigation of the Robert Marshall Foundation in 1944,
after the organization made grants to the Southern Conference for Human Welfare, the
Workers Defense League, and Tom Mooney, the chairman of the Citizens' Committee to
Free Earl Browder, the former head of the American Communist Party. All of these
groups, the Bureau noted, had been cited by either HUAC or the Attorney General as
communist fronts or communist-dominated. When Rauh and Chanler denied that
Remington's defense expenses had been paid by the communists, the FBI suggested
otherwise based on the Marshall Foundation's gifts. See generally Letter from D. M. Ladd
to J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the FBI (Jan. 17, 1951) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review).
204. MAY, supra note 142, at 164.
205. Id. at 165-66.
206. Judge Hand was especially troubled by the fact that the examination of Ann
Remington had been ex parte and without the presence and control of a judge or other
official. He considered the proceedings secret and coercive, and stated that, "[slave for
torture, it would be hard to find a more effective tool of tyranny than the power of
unlimited and unchecked ex parte examination." GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND:
THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 617 (1994). More recently, attorneys representing accused
terrorist Jose Padilla and others held in Cuba have also questioned the authority of the
United States government to detain and interrogate persons ex parte without the presence
of legal counsel. See William Glaberson, Judges Question Detention of American, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 18, 2003, at A19.
207. MAY, supra note 142, at 161.
208. Id. (quoting Ann Remington's grand jury testimony).
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At Remington's trial, Ann became even more confident and
incriminating. Remington was a communist at Dartmouth, she said.
Furthermore, he contributed financially to the party, recruited for the
party, and gave secrets to Bentley. 29 But under careful crossexamination by Chanler, Ann also maintained "we were not orthodox
Communists ....We were Communists as much as we wanted to
be. ' 210 When combined with testimony by Bentley, former classmates
at Dartmouth, and TVA employees who placed Remington at party
meetings, Ann Moos's statements helped convict Remington of
perjury on February 7, 1951.211

Throughout the trial, Rauh and Chanler tangled often with Judge
Gregory Noonan, who rejected their motions and imposed the
maximum sentence on Remington of five years in prison and a two
thousand dollar fine.212 Noonan even denied an extension of bail
pending an appeal because he believed his conduct had been flawless.
Rauh and Chanler thought otherwise. 213 Noonan, they believed, had
given improper instructions on the issue of "membership" in the
Communist Party, an error that allowed the jury to roam unchecked
and to equate harmless social engagements with active participation
in the party.214 They also challenged Noonan's decision to brush aside
their claims of coercion inside the grand jury room by foreman
Brunini, who had been aided by prosecutors Donegan and Irving
Saypol.

215

Rauh had good reasons to question what took place before the
grand jury. On the eve of the trial, Remington's lawyers were
approached by two employees of the publishing firm Devin-Adair
who offered them the astonishing information that Brunini had
signed a contract in 1950 which gave him a share of profits from
Bentley's planned book about her life in the communist
underground. 16 In short, the jury foreman had a pecuniary stake in
securing Remington's conviction that would assist in vindicating
209. See id. at 212.
210. Id. at 215.
211. Id. at 264.
212. Id. at 265.
213. Id. at 266.
214. When Rauh and Chanler asked Noonan at one point in the trial to define
"membership" in the Communist Party, the judge snapped back: "Ask him [Remington],
he knows." A three-judge panel of the circuit court, Thomas Swam, Gus Hand, and
Learned Hand, promptly reversed Noonan on the bail issue. In a crowded elevator as
they left the court that day, Learned Hand said to his cousin, "That's the most outrageous
thing I have ever heard." August 15th Rauh Interview, supra note 67.
215. Id.
216. MAY, supra note 142, at 235.
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Bentley's story regarding her espionage activities. 217 Finally, Rauh
and Webster hoped that an appeals court might be persuaded that
Ann Remington's grand jury testimony had been secured through
duress.
Chief prosecutor Saypol branded the defense witnesses who
testified about Brunini's book contract as liars. He also assured
Judge Noonan that no irregularities had taken place in the grand jury
room. Noonan quickly rejected the defense's motion to throw out the
indictment and refused to give Rauh and Chanler access to the grand
jury transcripts. Whatever the truth about Brunini and Bentley,
Noonan declared, twelve men voted to indict Remington, not one.
Undeterred, Rauh wanted to make grand jury misconduct the
centerpiece of their appeal in the hope of quashing the original
indictment.218 Chanler, however, opposed that strategy and placed
their emphasis instead upon Noonan's inept instructions about
2 19
membership in the Communist Party.
A distinguished three-judge panel of the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals, composed of Judges Tom Swan, Learned Hand, and
Augustus Hand, stunned the prosecution when it agreed unanimously
with Chanler's core argument that Noonan's instructions on
membership had been "too vague and indefinite to constitute any
definition at all of what facts the jury must find in order to convict the
defendant. ' 22 They also criticized Saypol for constantly invoking the
Attorney General's list as authority for subversion, ordered a new
trial for Remington, and further ruled that his lawyers should be
granted access to the grand jury proceedings to determine if
misconduct had taken place in securing the indictment.2 2'
Like the prior Loyalty Review Board ruling, the decision by the
court of appeals severely damaged the government's case against
Remington. Rauh, however, wanted to save his client further agony
with an extraordinary legal maneuver. Despite their partial victory in
217. Id. at 236.
218. Id. at 269.
219. Saypol had learned of the Brunini-Bentley connection before the Devin-Adair
employees came forward to testify. He had urged the Attorney General to seek a fresh
indictment, fearing that this secret would be exposed and ruin the prosecution's case. He
was overruled. At the time, even Saypol did not know that the grand jury proceedings had
been further compromised by the fact that Donegan and another prosecution witness,
Joseph Egan, also had prior legal relationships with Bentley. See Brief for Appellant at
36-37, United States v. Remington, 191 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1951) (No. 51-22045); MAY,
supra note 142, at 204.
220. United States v. Remington, 191 F.2d 246, 250-51 (2d Cir. 1951); Remington
Verdict Is Upset on Appeal; New Trial Studied, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 23,1951, at 1.
221. Remington, 191 F.2d at 250-51.
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the court of appeals, he believed they should ask the Supreme Court
to review the circuit court, where they would place the emphasis upon
grand jury coercion and corruption and have the original indictment
thrown out.2 22 Content with a new trial, Chanler thought Rauh's
gambit would fail, but he reluctantly went along with petitioning the
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. 23 As it turned out, Rauh was
not the only one who could think creatively about the Remington
case in light of what the circuit court had ruled and the petition for
certiorari.
Rauh's bold move provoked an equally unprecedented response
from the prosecutors, who quickly secured a fresh grand jury
indictment against Remington. 24 They now charged him with five
counts of perjury for statements made while testifying at his trial. 25
They also petitioned the United States Supreme Court to throw out
the original indictment. 26 This strategy came from the fertile brain of
Saypol's chief assistant, Roy Cohn, the pudgy son of a former New
York jurist, whom
Chanler referred to as the prosecution's "ever227
active genie.
In 1951, Roy Cohn played a major role along with Saypol in the
trial of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg for atomic espionage and soon
joined Senator McCarthy's staff as chief counsel. 28 Cohn thought it
hopeless for the government to win on the membership issue in the
Supreme Court, and he feared further judicial inquiry into the
unsavory tactics used against Ann Moos during the grand jury
proceedings. 29
Rauh led a chorus of criticism against the government's new
indictment and Cohn's attempt to void the first one. The latter he
denounced as a tactic designed to avoid the rule against doublejeopardy and to cover up the prosecution's own dubious conduct
before the grand jury. The Supreme Court rejected a part of Cohn's
strategy when it refused to quash the first indictment, 23 ° but on March
222. August 15th Rauh Interview, supra note 67.
223. Id.
224. MAY, supra note 142, at 273.
225. Id. at 273-74.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 273.
228. NICHOLAS VON HOFFMAN, CITIZEN COHN: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF ROY
COHN 94-104, 138-44 (1988) (describing Cohn in the Rosenberg trial and his acceptance
of the job with Senator McCarthy).
229. Id.; SIDNEY ZION, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF ROY COHN 46-52 (1988).
230. See Remington v. United States, 342 U.S. 895, 895 (1951) (dismissing motion for
leave to apply to the district court to dismiss indictment).
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24, 1952, the justices also declined to hear Rauh's appeal of
misconduct by the grand jury.231 Remington faced a second trial, but
he would do so without Joe Rauh.2 32
Rauh declined to represent Remington at this point because he
was worn down by the first battle and he found himself at odds over
trial strategy with Chanler and with Chanler's replacement, John
Minton, a seasoned criminal lawyer. The government now claimed
that Remington had lied while on the witness stand at his trial
concerning attendance at Communist Party meetings, giving
information to Bentley, paying party dues, and regarding his
knowledge of the Young Communist League at Dartmouth.3 3 Rauh
argued that they would never persuade a new jury to acquit
Remington on all of these charges against the background of the war
raging in Korea, combined with the testimony of Ann Moos and
Bentley. The only hope for Remington, he told them, rested at the
court of appeals and the Supreme Court with a frontal attack on the
legality of the original grand jury indictment.234
Minton, whose nephew had been killed recently in Korea and
who harbored strong anti-communist views, rejected Rauh's strategy.
So did Chanler and Remington. The latter had become persuaded
that the government would never rest until he had been acquitted or
convicted by a jury. Discouraged about this strategy, Rauh withdrew
from the second trial, but not without telling Chanler that he believed
their "path of least resistance... is the road to defeat. ' 2 35 In his
heart, he hoped they would prove him wrong. 36
The Minton-Chanler strategy failed. After a trial that lasted only
ten days in January 1953, the jury found Remington guilty on two of
the five counts of perjury-giving Bentley information to which she
was not entitled and knowledge of the YCL at Dartmouth. 23 7 The
judge sentenced him to three years in prison.238 Minton argued that
231. See Remington v. United States, 343 U.S. 907, 907-08 (1952). Three justices, Felix
Frankfurter, Hugo Black, and William 0. Douglas voted to hear the case, but only Black
and Douglas publicly expressed their dismay with the court's refusal to grant certiorari.
Id. Black believed that the Bentley-Brunini connection and the prosecution's failure to
disclose it constituted conduct "abhorrent to a fair administration of justice" and probably
denied Remington due process of law. Id.
232. Interview with Joseph Rauh, Jr., in Washington, D.C. (Aug. 16, 1985) [hereinafter
August 16th Rauh Interview].
233. See MAY, supra note 142, at 273.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 279.
236. Id.; August 16th Rauh Interview, supra note 232.
237. MAY, supra note 142, at 288.
238. Id. at 292.
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on appeal they should focus narrowly on the sufficiency and
admissibility of certain evidence. 23 9 Rauh, still smarting from the
rejection of his grand jury strategy, but convinced the case raised a
profound constitutional question, urged Remington to appeal on his
theory. After an emotional dinner reunion in New York where he
further probed Remington's innocence, Rauh agreed to write a brief
with the assistance of Richard Green and Pollitt and to argue the
appeal himself before the circuit court.24
With Remington already in prison at Lewisburg Penitentiary,
Rauh made a simple and eloquent argument before Judges Swan and
the two Hands on October 15, 1953.241 The United States, having
originally procured Remington's indictment and first trial by coerced
and corrupt means, could not indict him for what he said while on the
witness stand. Moreover, Rauh argued, the original grand jury
proceedings proved clearly that Brunini and Donegan, one a literary
collaborator with Bentley and the other her former attorney, coerced
testimony from Ann Remington and deceived her concerning her
legal rights. Rauh 2also contended that prosecutors hid these wrongs
24
from the defense.
Rauh realized that in a recent decision, United States v.
Williams,243 the Supreme Court ruled that a legally defective

indictment did not nullify a conviction for perjury committed while on
trial under that indictment. 24 But, in Williams, the indictment had
been technically flawed (the defendant was charged with the wrong
offense), and was not the result of serious misconduct by a grand jury
foreman and prosecutors. 24 5 Remington's case, Rauh argued, more
closely resembled those arising under illegal searches and seizures or
wiretapping, where the Supreme Court ruled that the government
could not profit from its own wrongdoing or use tainted evidence, the
so-called "fruit of the poisonous tree" defense. 246 These decisions,
239. Id.
240. Remington reaffirmed to Rauh his innocence on both perjury counts: he had
never knowingly engaged in espionage with Bentley or belonged to the Communist Party.
An undated memorandum in Rauh's papers, "Spy Rings and Riddles" notes that since the
FBI had Bentley and Jacob Golos under surveillance from 1940 until the latter's death in
1943, the Bureau either believed any information they received was of little value or the
Bureau bungled its responsibilities to protect the nation's secrets. Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., Spy
Rings and Riddles 1-5 (undated) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
241. See MAY, supra note 142, at 301.
242. Id.
243. 341 U.S. 58 (1945).
244. Id. at 82.
245. Id.
246. August 16th Rauh Interview, supra note 232.
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moreover, were authored by Justices Holmes and Frankfurter, two
justices likely to impress the circuit court.247
Rauh asked the circuit court judges to make a modest intellectual
leap from cases like Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States2 48 and
Nardone v. United States249 to the facts present in Remington's. But
only Learned Hand, whose dissent blistered the prosecution's
Swan,
conduct before the grand jury, accepted the argument.
although not unmoved by Rauh's arguments, thought the Supreme
Court should make the leap, not the court of appeals.25 ' Augustus
Hand, despite his cousin's fervent pleas, remained unmoved.252 He
viewed the grand jury misconduct and Remington's subsequent
perjury as two distinct events. 253 Reversing the conviction, he
claimed, would only encourage other defendants to lie on the witness
stand. 4 In a two to one decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed
Remington's conviction for perjury. 5
Three months later, after receiving Rauh's petition for certiorari,
the Supreme Court of the United States again declined to hear
Remington's appeal,256 a decision that led Hand privately to express
his profound sadness about the outcome to Frankfurter. At the
Supreme Court, Rauh's brief and Hand's impassioned dissent had
encouraged at least three justices-Frankfurter, Black, and
Douglas-to support review, but they could not secure the vote of
Justice Jackson. 257 Rauh learned later that personal bitterness and
ideological conflict between Black and Jackson played a major role in
the Court's refusal to hear the case.258 Black expressed the view that

247. Brief for Appellant, United States v. Remington, 191 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1951) (No.
51-22045); see, e.g., Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 383 (1937) (holding that
methods used by officers of the state that are "inconsistent with ethical standards" are
"destructive of personal liberty"); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385,
392 (1920) (stating that "knowledge gained by the Government's own wrong cannot be
used by it").
248. 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
249. 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
250. See United States v. Remington, 208 F.2d 567, 571-75 (2d Cir. 1953) (critiquing

the coercive extraction of privileged information in an ex parte examination).
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

MAY, supra note 142, at 302-03.
Id. at 303.
Id.
Id.
Remington, 208 F.2d at 571. See generally GUNTHER, supra note 206, at 614-20

(providing context for the case and the decision, particularly Judge Hand's lone dissent).
256. Remington v. United States, 347 U.S. 913 (1954) (denial of certiorari).
257. August 16th Rauh Interview, supra note 232.

258. ld.
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the case could be used to overrule Williams.2 59 Frankfurter, who had

also dissented in Williams, believed the two cases distinguishable and
blamed Black's willfulness for alienating Jackson and dooming
Remington's appeal.2 6 °

Even had they secured Jackson's vote for certiorari, Rauh knew
that the possibility of overturning Remington's conviction remained
much in doubt.

With Justice Tom Clark, the former Attorney

General, likely to recuse himself, 261 the probable vote (assuming
Justice Jackson joined Justices Black, Douglas, and Frankfurter)
would have been four to four,262 a result that would have affirmed the

circuit court decision and kept Remington in prison.
No macabre twist in Remington's case, however, prepared Rauh
for the final tragedy.

In November 1954, eight months before

Remington's scheduled release from Lewisburg, three fellow inmates
attacked him in his cell and beat him to death.2 63 The prosecutors and
prison officials insisted that Remington's murder resulted from an
attempted robbery gone awry. 264 Roy Cohn claimed until his own
death from AIDS in 1986 that Remington had been a victim of "a
turgid sexually motivated murder. '265 But the three men convicted of
his murder-George McCoy, Lewis Cagle, Jr., and Robert Parkernursed intense anti-communist sentiments and each claimed their
attack had been politically motivated. 66 The Bureau of Prisons hid
those facts for three decades, perpetrating the last cover up in the
Remington case.267

259. Id.
260. GUNTHER, supra note 207, at 623-24; see Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., Felix Frankfurter:
Civil Libertarian, 11 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 496, 510-13 (1976); August 18th Rauh
Interview, supra note 30. Rauh believed that Justice Frankfurter's intense dislike of
Justice Black in 1954 blinded him to Justice Jackson's own complicity in the Remington
tragedy. A year earlier during the final appeals in the Rosenberg case, Justice Jackson had
behaved in a similar manner by refusing to hear the Rosenbergs' appeal when Justice
Douglas's behavior offended him. See Michael E. Parrish, Cold War Justice: The Supreme
Court and the Rosenbergs, 82 AM. HIST. REV. 805, 816-20 (1977).
261. August 16th Rauh Interview, supra note 232.
262. Id.
263. MAY, supra note 142, at 307-10.
264. See id. at 312-15.
265. See ZION, supra note 229, at 57.
266. See MAY, supra note 142, at 307-15.
267. Id. at 3-9. Morton Sobell, the convicted atom spy, believed that persons
connected with the Bureau of Prisons engineered Remington's murder. Historian Lee
Jones first secured the Bureau of Prisons files through a Freedom of Information Act
lawsuit and disproved this theory. See Lee W. Jones, After 33 Years, The Real Story,
NATION, Jan. 9, 1988, at 8.
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VII. TURNING THE TIDE: PETERS, TAYLOR, AND GREENE

All of Rauh's legal skills could not save Bill Remington from the
anti-communist hysteria that spread its venom even inside a
maximum security federal prison, but his tragic death heightened
Rauh's resolve to destroy the basic evil at the heart of the loyaltysecurity program-non-confrontation. Before President Truman,
hearing boards, congressional committees, and in courtrooms he
attacked the unfairness of that procedure at every opportunity since
1947. Slowly, due in large measure to the efforts of Rauh and other
attorneys, the courts came around to this point of view, but only after
the Red Scare cooled in the late 1950s following the end of the
Korean War, the disgrace of Senator McCarthy, and the death of
Stalin.
The loyalty program's long-standing policy that denied to
government employees the right to confront their accusers and
subject them to cross-examination became even more crucial for
Rauh and his clients after 1953 when the Eisenhower Administration
tightened the regulations to provide that federal employees could
retain their jobs only if the hearing boards believed their retention
was "clearly consistent with the interests of the national security." 2"
Those new regulations also expanded the list of grounds for dismissal
to include:
Any behavior, activities, or associations which tend to show
that the individual is not reliable or trustworthy.
Any... infamous, dishonest, immoral, or notoriously
disgraceful conduct... [or] any facts which furnish reason to
believe that the individual may be subjected to coercion,
influence, or pressure which may cause 269
him to act contrary to
the best interests of the national security.
Filled with Truman appointees, the Supreme Court majority
displayed little sympathy for the victims of non-confrontation until
Earl Warren succeeded Fred Vinson as Chief Justice in 1953. In the
first test case, with three of Truman's justices voting as a block, the
court by a four to four decision would not endorse the principle that
the government's failure to allow a dismissed employee to confront
his or her accusers violated the Constitution.2 ° Despite a biting
dissent on the circuit court and others offered by Justices Black,
268. Exec. Order No. 10,450, 3 C.F.R. 936 (1949-1953).
269. Id.
270. Bailey v. Richardson, 341 U.S. 918, 918 (1951) (plurality decision) (affirming the
trial court's decision).
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Douglas, Frankfurter, and Jackson, the Truman majority ruled that
the guarantee of the Sixth Amendment applied only to criminal
prosecutions, not to administrative proceedings such as those
involved in the loyalty program.2 71 Rauh and other civil liberties
lawyers did not abandon the fight.
In 1955, Rauh filed an amicus brief on behalf of John Peters, a
distinguished member of the Yale Medical School who had been
dismissed as a special consultant to the Surgeon General. The
Loyalty Review Board, overruling a lower tribunal, found reasonable
doubt as to his loyalty.2 72 Rauh and others hoped the justices would
address the constitutional question and perhaps overturn Bailey v.
2 73
Richardson.
In addition to Rauh and Arthur Goldberg, whose brief
spoke for the CIO, Peters's appeal enlisted an extraordinary group of
attorneys, including Thurman Arnold, Paul Porter, Abe Fortas, and
the ACLU's Herbert Monte Levy and Morris Ernst.274
To the great embarrassment of the Eisenhower Administration,
the distinguished Solicitor General Simon Sobeloff argued that the
government's own appeal was unjust and contrary to the public
interest, and refused to sign the government's brief or to appear
before the Supreme Court.275 But to the dismay of Rauh and the
attorneys, a majority of the justices, led by Justice Frankfurter,
elected to avoid the constitutional question. They reversed the
Loyalty Review Board in Peters v. Hobby,276 but only on the grounds
that the board lacked the authority to overrule a lower board's
decision to acquit such an employee.277
By 1957, Rauh believed he had a case that would at last trump
271. Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 65 (D.C. Cir. 1950). Justice Clark, the fourth
Truman appointee and former Attorney General when Miss Bailey had been dismissed,
did not participate in the case.
272. August 18th Rauh Interview, supra note 30.
273. 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
274. See Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331, 332 (1955).
275. See LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE: THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND
THE RULE OF LAW 11-12 (1987). With Sobeloff and his staff in rebellion against the
Administration's legal position, Attorney General Herbert Brownell prevailed upon
another Justice Department official to argue the case. Id. at 11. For this effort, Warren
Burger was elevated a year later to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Id.
at 12. Sobeloff later became a federal court of appeals judge. Id.
276. 349 U.S. 331 (1955).
277. Rauh's old mentor, Justice Frankfurter, advanced this narrow approach to the
resolution of the Peters case during oral argument and persuaded Warren to adopt it for
the majority. Neither the government nor Peters's attorneys had raised the issue,
prompting Arnold to protest the Frankfurter gambit. Justices Black and Douglas believed
the Court should have decided the constitutional problem. August 18th Rauh Interview,
supranote 30; see Peters,349 U.S. at 338.
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the government on non-confrontation in security cases.
He
represented Charles Allen Taylor, a member of the United
Automobile Workers, who had been fired from his job at Bell
Aircraft after the Pentagon's loyalty board twice ruled that his access
to classified defense information was "not clearly consistent with the
interests of national security. 2 78 At both hearings, the Defense
Department board refused to divulge the identity of those who had
made statements against Taylor, a ruling upheld by the district court,
but which Rauh
appealed on the grounds that it had denied Taylor
2 79
due process.

Rauh had found the perfect case, but not the one furthest down
the litigation track. The Supreme Court had already agreed to hear
the appeal of William L. Greene, a businessman who, like Taylor, had
been banned from further access to defense "secrets," some of which
he had developed for the Navy at his own electronics company.280
Green, like Taylor, was not able to confront his accusers. The justices
agreed finally to hear Taylor's case without intermediate review by
the court
of appeals so that it might be argued along with Greene's
281
case.
Lawyers for the Justice and Defense Departments also sensed
Rauh had a winning case. Four months prior to oral argument the

Pentagon capitulated in an attempt to avoid a Supreme Court
decision. The department announced that "the granting of clearance
to Mr. Charles Allen Taylor for access to Secret defense information
is in the national interest. ' 2 2 Two weeks later, as Rauh expected, the
government's lawyers asked the Supreme Court to dismiss Taylor's

suit on grounds of mootness. 2s3

The Supreme Court, however,

refused to rule on that point until after full argument on the merits.2 s 4

On March 31 and April Fool's Day, 1959, Rauh, representing
Taylor, and Carl W. Beruefly, representing Greene, asked the justices

to rule that their clients had been denied fundamental rights to
confront their accusers and cross-examine them under the
Constitution of the United States.2 5 With only Clark in dissent, the
Supreme Court agreed that Greene had been illegally denied security
278. Taylor v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 709, 710 (1959).
279. August 18th Rauh Interview, supra note 30.
280. See Rauh, supra note 66, at 1175-76.
281. Taylor, 360 U.S. at 709 (stating that this case is a companion case to Greene v.
McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959)).
282. Id. at 710.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. August 18th Rauh Interview, supra note 30.
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clearances, but not on constitutional grounds.286 Again avoiding that
issue, the majority ruled simply that neither executive orders nor
congressional legislation authorized the Defense Department to
operate its Industrial Security Program without the guarantees of
confrontation and cross-examination. 287 Led by Chief Justice Warren,
however, five members of the majority made it clear that any loyalty
procedures without such guarantees would also violate constitutional
due process.288
Rauh, the leading opponent of non-confrontation from the
beginning of the loyalty program, technically lost the constitutional
race to Beruefly. The justices ruled Taylor's suit moot on the same
day they held for Greene, and ordered that the loyalty proceeding
conform to due process. 289 Although his case did not stand for a
shining legal principle, Taylor reaped more immediate benefits. The
government gave an ironclad guarantee to Rauh that it would restore
Taylor's clearance, that no evidence in his file would be used in the
future, and that the findings against him would be expunged. 290 These
concessions, Rauh observed, "made Taylor's clearance probably the
most rock-ribbed and unassailable in the history of the security
programs. "291
CONCLUSION

The victories of Rauh and Beruefly in Taylor and Greene
climaxed an aggressive campaign by civil liberties lawyers in the 1950s
to turn back the momentum of the repressive anti-communist crusade
of the Truman years. In addition to Rauh's success in the Watkins
case, 292 these crusaders persuaded the Warren Court to strike down a
provision in the New York City charter that provided for summary
dismissal of employees who invoked the privilege against selfincrimination; 293 to invalidate Pennsylvania's state sedition act;2 94 and
286. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474,474-75 (1959).
287. Id. at 474.

288. Id. at 506-08.
289. Taylor, 360 U.S. at 711.
290. Id.
291. Rauh, supra note 66, at 1182.
292. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1956).
293. See Slochower v. Bd. of Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 558-59 (1956) (holding that the
summary dismissal in this case violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
294. See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 337-38 (1957) (reversing the Smith Act
convictions of fourteen leaders of the Communist Party in California); Pennsylvania v.
Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 504 (1956) (ruling that the federal Smith Act preempted the
Pennsylvania Sedition Act).
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to curb the State Department's denial of passports to American
citizens.29 5 In the same term as Taylor and Greene, however, the
Justices began to backtrack in the face of mounting criticism in
Congress and elsewhere, including a committee of the American Bar
Association that declared that the Supreme Court decisions
encouraged communist activities in the United States.296 The Court
cut back on Watkins in Barenblatt v. United States,297 and two years
later sustained the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950.298 This
brief retreat lasted until the retirements of Justices Frankfurter and
Whittaker in 1962. Nevertheless, the addition of Justices Arthur
Goldberg and Byron White to the bench opened a new liberal
chapter in the history of the Warren Court. Rauh and other civil
liberties lawyers helped to write its prologue in their campaign against
the excesses of the loyalty-security program.
On an individual level, Joe Rauh's decade-long war against the
abuses of the loyalty-security program displayed all of his
considerable virtues as a lawyer and a human being-extraordinary
stamina, bold litigation strategy, and a willingness to make substantial
personal and financial sacrifices on behalf of important principles of
fairness and justice. His fight against the Cold War's loyalty-security
program also demonstrated the continued vitality of a long and proud
tradition of the American bar: that whenever the United States
government invoked foreign threats to justify policies imposing
"fetters... on liberty at home,"2 99 there would be courageous lawyers
ready to come forward to defend individual rights. He would be
heartened today, however, by the example of other lawyers who have
come forward in the days and months since September 11th to
challenge the actions of the United States government that in the
recent words of appellate judge Barrington D. Parker, Jr., threaten "a
sea change in the constitutional life of this country."31°

295. See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 130 (1958) (holding that the Secretary of State
was not authorized to deny passports on grounds of immigrants' communist beliefs).
296. ED CRAY, CHIEF JUSTICE: A BIOGRAPHY OF EARL WARREN 352-53 (1997)
(chronicling the life of the Chief Justice).
297. 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
298. See Communist Party of the U.S. v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1,
56, 86 (1961) (holding that the registration requirements of the Subversive Activities
Control Act were neither unconstitutional as a bill of attainder nor unconstitutional as a
violation of the First Amendment).
299. See Madison, supra note 1, at 241-42.
300. Glaberson, supra note 206; see also Eric Lichtblan, Citing Free Speech, Judge
Voids Partof AntiterrorAct, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2004, at A21 (reporting that a federal
judge struck down part of the USA Patriot Act).
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